The effects of personal and corporate income tax changes on the Estonian economy by Nurges, Dagmar
University of Tartu
Faculty of Social Sciences
School of Economics and Business Administration
Dagmar Nurges
The effects of personal and corporate
income tax changes on the Estonian
economy
Master's thesis
Supervisor: Lenno Uusküla (PhD)
Tartu 2018
Name and signature of supervisor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Allowed for defence on...............................................
(date)
I have written this master's thesis independently. All viewpoints of other
authors, literary sources and data from elsewhere used for writing this paper
have been referenced.
...............................................
(signature of author)
1
Abstract
The paper analyses the dynamic effects of personal and corporate income tax
rates on the Estonian economy using narrative tax shocks in instrumental
variable approach in vector autoregressive model for the period 2000Q1 to
2017Q4. Surprisingly a reduction in the average personal income tax rate
leads to a decrease in output, government purchases and employment and
an increase in the unemployment rate. Furthermore, a reduction in the
corporate income tax rate does not have an effect on government spending,
but reduces the unemployment rate. Reductions in the average personal and
corporate income tax rate produce opposite signs in the unemployment rate
which may be caused by alterations in government spending and not directly
due to tax changes.
Keywords: personal income taxes, corporate income taxes, VAR, Estonia
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Introduction
In order to make the best use of different policy instruments, policy makers
need to know their estimated impact on the economy. Among these policy
tools are taxes by means of which most countries accumulate a big part of
their national budget. Changing the tax rates can have a strong impact
on a country's economy and when assessing these effects, it is important to
make a difference between anticipated and unanticipated tax shocks as it has
been showed that analyses which ignore this aspect produce biased estimates
(Leeper et al., 2013).
The current study estimates the influence of income tax rates on the Estonian
macroeconomic aggregates and studies the transmission through labor mar-
ket indicators such as employment and unemployment. The paper finds that
a cut in the average personal income tax rate (APITR) by one percentage
point leads to a decline in the Estonian economy. More specifically, APITR
itself recovers to its pre-shock level in 2 quarters, output is shown to fall by
approximately 0.5 percent while government purchases may be decreased by
as much as 1 percent. As for the labor market, estimations imply a reduc-
tion in employment by roughly 0.5 percent and a rise in the unemployment
rate by up to 3.4 percentage points as a result of reducing average personal
income tax rate by one percentage point. Nevertheless, these last outcomes
may not be pure effects of tax changes but rather a reaction to reduced gov-
ernment spending. All of these results are statistically significant at least at
68 percent confidence level.
A one percentage point reduction in the average corporate income tax rate
(ACITR) does not lead to statistically significant changes in output and
government purchases while ACITR itself recovers to its pre-shock level in 3
quarters after the cut. Nevertheless, employment is shown to increase by as
much as 0.3 percent and the unemployment rate is decreased by up to 2.7
percentage points. Results for the labor market are statistically significant
at 68 percent confidence level.
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The paper uses a structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) model and quar-
terly data of various indicators for the period from 2000Q1 to 2017Q4. One
of the main hindrances in estimating the aftermath of changes in tax policy
is endogeneity in the identification of these changes. In the context of this
study it will be dealt with by the use of narratively identified tax changes
as did Romer and Romer (2010), and Mertens and Ravn (2013). This helps
to identify the most important features of an immense information package
related to tax policy changes. Effects of personal and corporate income tax
rates are investigated separately and only unanticipated tax shocks are in-
cluded in the analysis. Relevant tax changes were identified from the tax
acts announced by the legislative power of Estonia.
The paper contributes to the literature in three aspects. First, Estonia is
an interesting country to study because the country is in a relatively rare
position as a small open economy striving for a balanced budget. Due to this
aspiration changing the tax rates may have unexpected effects on its economy
compared to many other countries. Secondly, in Estonia most of the changes
in the tax rate are announced several months before their implementation
which makes it difficult to estimate their effects. The paper at hand is dealing
with this problem as only unanticipated tax shocks are used in the analysis.
Thirdly, personal and corporate income tax base, hours per worker and labor
force estimates are also included in this work. There do not seem to be any
other studies for Estonia that incorporate these variables.
Most studies that contrast taxes to different economic variables are based
on the U.S. data which is very different from Estonia by means of its size,
openness and budget policy to mention only a few factors. Compared to the
studies using Estonian data the main advantage of the present one is the
use of narratively identified tax shocks which makes them more exogenous
and their effects easily detectable as well as separating the unanticipated tax
shocks from the anticipated.
Literature suggests that a lower tax rate of both personal and corporate in-
come taxes generally leads to a higher level of GDP (Mertens and Ravn,
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2013; Barro and Redlick, 2009; Mourougane and Vogel, 2008; Ahmad and
Xiao, 2013; Font et al., 2018; Bajo-Rubio and Gomez-Plana, 2015; Prillaman
and Meier, 2014; Sarker et al., 2014; Konopczy«ski, 2013). It can be both
due to an increase in investments (Masso et al., 2013; Salotti and Trecroti,
2015; Abdio§lu et al., 2016; Font et al., 2018; Bhattarai and Trzeciakiewicz,
2017) which leads to a higher level of output as well as through higher wages
that cause an expansion in consumption (Masso and Meriküll, 2013; Bhat-
tarai and Trzeciakiewicz, 2017). However the findings of the current study
are in line with the paper by Hungerford (2018) who also finds that the rela-
tionship between corporate tax rates and GDP growth rate is weak and not
statistically significant.
The findings on labor markets are not surprising. Literature seems to suggest
that the direction and size of this impact is dependent on the method used
and countries studied. Since there seems to be no universal rule for all
countries in this matter, it is important that each country determines the
nature of this relationship on their own. Knowing in which direction and
how much changes in tax policy change the economic situation enables policy
makers to achieve the desired effects more likely. For example, Staehr (2008)
and Paulus et al. (2007) study the impact of income taxes on the labor
market in Estonia. Staehr (2008) finds that a reduction in personal labor
income tax results in an increase in employment and the study by Paulus
et al. (2007) shows that a reduction in labor marginal income tax increases
unemployment. The current study confirms the findings with the effects
found in Paulus et al. (2007).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 1 gives an overview
of the literature covering the linkage between taxation and macroeconomic
effects focusing on the impact on output and its components as well as the
labor market. Section 2 describes the dataset and method used to attain
the results. Section 3 presents benchmark outcomes at first and then focuses
on the labor market and other variables. Robustness of the results is also
discussed in this section. The last section makes the concluding remarks of
the paper.
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1 Literature review
Several different methods and datasets have been used to assess the macroe-
conomic effects taxes impose on an economy. These methods can be divided
into three groups: 1) macroeconomic regressions, 2) microeconomic regres-
sions, and 3) various theoretical models. This paper uses structural vector
autoregression model which belongs to the group of macroeconomic regres-
sions. That approach is also used by Mertens and Ravn (2013), and Sarker
et al. (2014).
There are many macroeconomic regression set-ups that use different single
and simultaneous equations regression models with contemporaneous restric-
tions to determine the impact of taxes (see for example Salotti, S., and Tre-
croti, C., 2015; Prillaman and Meier, 2014; Abdio§lu et al., 2016; Zellner
and Ngoie, 2015; Staehr, 2008; Hungerford, 2018; Barro and Redlick, 2009;
Võrk et al., 2007; Feldmann, 2011; Neverauskien
e et al., 2017; Festa, 2015).
Compared to this group the instrumental variable SVAR has the advantage
of simultaneously regressing multiple variables and it is also robust to mea-
surement errors arising from inaccurately determining the size, timing or
motivation of used shocks. Compared to microeconomic regression analysis
used by Bennmarker et al. (2009) and Masso et al. (2013) SVAR has all
the advantages mentioned in relation to macroeconomic regression analysis
as well as the use of macroeconomic variables that consider a broader range
of instruments.
The use of theoretical models is also very popular approach to evaluate the
impact of taxes. See for example papers by Mourougane and Vogel, 2008;
Ahmad and Xiao, 2013; Font et al., 2018; Bajo-Rubio and Gomez-Plana,
2015; Konopczy«ski, 2013; Wang, 1993; Bhattarai and Dixon, 2014; Betten-
dorf et al., 2009, Böhringer et al., 2005; Daveri and Tabellini, 2000; Paulus
et al., 2007; Alho, 2006; Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000; Bhattarai and Trzeci-
akiewicz, 2017; García and Sala, 2008; and Halko, 2005. The most important
advantage of SVAR over this method is that SVAR makes use of real data
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and derives conclusions based on actual outcomes while theoretical models
use a structure that does not necessarily reflect the world and can lead to
erroneous conclusions.
As stated above, the present study makes use of an SVAR approach which
is an expansion of VAR as it combines economic theory with time series
analysis. Its main advantage is that economic theory is able to provide the
necessary restrictions on the estimated model of reduced form. Depending
on the temporal nature of the underlying shocks, these restrictions can either
be contemporaneous or long-run (McCoy, 1997). Another advantage of this
method is robustness to various types of measurement errors (Mertens and
Ravn, 2013) which will be covered in more detail below.
Literature generally suggests that a reduction in business taxes has a pos-
itive effect on the economic aggregates, such as an increase in output and
decreased unemployment rate. Thus a reduction in taxes has been one of
the mechanisms governments use all over the world to boost the economy
although not every article on this matter is supportive of this conclusion.
More specifically, multiple studies show that a reduction in income or busi-
ness taxes gives rise to an increase in output (Mertens and Ravn, 2013; Masso
and Meriküll, 2011; Barro and Redlick, 2009; Mourougane and Vogel, 2008;
Ahmad and Xiao, 2013; Font et al., 2018; Bajo-Rubio and Gomez-Plana,
2015; Prillaman and Meier, 2014; Sarker et al., 2014; Konopczy«ski, 2013).
Quantitative results of these studies imply that a one percentage point cut in
labor taxes increases GDP by roughly 0.4-0.5 percent compared to the base-
line scenario. A study by Zellner and Ngoie (2015) uses a different approach,
but its outcome that reducing the personal income tax rate provides a boost
to the annual GDP growth is in alignment with the ones mentioned earlier.
Nevertheless, a recent study by Hungerford (2018) finds contradicting ev-
idence and argues that high corporate tax rates do not have any effect on
economic growth. He says that between 1946 and 2016 real GDP growth and
the one-year lag of the statutory corporate tax rate share a correlation coef-
ficient of +0.19, and from 1954 to 2006 real GDP growth rate and one-year
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lagged value of the effective marginal tax rate on capital income share a cor-
relation coefficient of -0.07. Neither of these results are said to be statistically
significant.
As for the components of GDP, reduction in income taxes is argued both
to decrease consumption (Font et al., 2018) as well as increase it (Bhattarai
and Trzeciakiewicz, 2017) while investments are shown to increase (Salotti
and Trecroti, 2015; Abdio§lu et al., 2016; Font et al., 2018; Bhattarai and
Trzeciakiewicz, 2017) as a result of cutting income tax rates. In case of
Estonia it is shown that cutting the corporate income taxes leads to a higher
level of consumption and lower level of government spending (Masso and
Meriküll, 2011) as well as a higher level of investments (Masso et al., 2013).
Numerous articles have studies the effect of taxes on employment and unem-
ployment, results range from negative to positive. These results depend on
the model and the prevailing circumstances of a country. It is shown on sev-
eral occasions that raising the tax rate leads to an increase in employment.
See for example papers by Berger and Everaert, 2010; Carcía and Sala, 2008
and Daveri and Tabellini, 2000; Bajo-Rubio and Gomez-Plana, 2015; Font
et al., 2018; Staehr, 2008; Bettendorf et al., 2009; Neverauskien
e et al., 2017;
Planas et al., 2007; Hagedorn et al., 2016; Võrk et al., 2007; Alho, 2006;
Coenen et al., 2008; or Böhringer et al., 2005. In these studies a tax rate cut
of one percentage point is shown to increase the employment rate by 0.2-0.7
percentage points.
Other studies find no statistically significant relationship between taxes and
(un)employment (Cruces et al., 2010; Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000; Benn-
marker et al., 2009 and Hoel, 1989) and there are even some studies that
imply that reducing the tax rates leads to an expansion of unemployment.
Feldmann (2011) shows that corporate tax decrease by 1 percentage point
increases the unemployment rate by 0.21 percentage points and Paulus et
al. (2007) show that a one percentage point cut in marginal income tax rate
leads to an increase in the unemployment rate by 1.6 percentage points. Pril-
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laman and Meier (2014) find that one percentage point reduction of business
taxes decreases the employment rate by 0.7172 percent.
Ahmad and Xiao (2013) also consider the effects on the hours worked and find
that a reduction in labor hours can be achieved by lowering corporate income
taxes. These effects can be contrasted to the ones obtained by Mertens
and Ravn (2013) who argue that lowering the corporate tax rate has no
statistically significant effect on hours per worker and that they can even be
increased by decreasing personal income taxes.
There are two studies on the (un)employment based on Estonian data in-
cluded in this literature review. First one is by Paulus et al. (2007). They
show that lower labor marginal income tax rate leads to an increase in the
unemployment rate while Staehr (2008) finds that an increase of the personal
labor income tax rate by 1 percentage point decreases employment by 0.36
percentage points. The first paper is based on Estonian Labour Force Survey
conducted in 2004 and the second one is based on results of the same survey
a year later.
It is clear that literature fails to produce an answer to how the labor market
is influenced by tax rates that works on all circumstances. The direction and
amplitude of this impact depend on the prevailing economic situation in the
country and also on the approach used for the estimation as the shocks might
include for example anticipated effects in case of early announcements of tax
changes or shocks.
2 Data and method
2.1 Data
The paper first identifies narrative tax shocks for Estonia during the years
2000  2017. Similarly to Mertens and Ravn (2013) a differentiation is made
between the effects of changes in average personal income tax rates (APITR)
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and the effects of changes in average corporate income tax rates (ACITR).
Tax changes for which the time between their announcement and imple-
mentation is more than one quarter are not included due to the fact that
anticipated tax changes may affect the economy ahead of their implementa-
tion. This phenomenon has been studied on several occasions, including by
House and Shapiro (2006), Yang (2005), Auerbach (1989) and Hall (1971).
Identification and determination of the size and timing of narrative tax
changes is done similarly to Romer and Romer (2009). I identify the rel-
evant tax changes from the announced tax acts imposed by Riigikogu  the
legislative power in Estonia  and study the changes in income tax, social
tax, funded pensions and unemployment insurance acts. Overall there are
117 legal instruments that make amendments in the income tax act, 13 of
which are changing the tax revenue. In case of social tax act there are 71
modifying legal instruments, 9 of which change the revenue.
There are 31 legal instruments amending the funded pensions act and 47
instruments amending the unemployment insurance act. There is only one
document for each of these acts that changes the tax revenue. After account-
ing for the implementation lag less than one quarter I find four unanticipated
tax changes both in case of income tax and social tax. Descriptions of these
changes are included in Appendix A and together they contribute to eight
alterations in personal income taxes and two changes in corporate income
taxes. Contributions to social insurance are included as a part of personal
income taxes. Volumes of these tax changes are found by dividing the changes
in tax revenue with real GDP and they are depicted in Figure 1 along with
the average personal income tax rate and average corporate income tax rate
which are calculated as
APITRt =(Personal Current Taxest + Contrib. for Govt. Social Insurancet)
/Personal Taxable Incomet
ACITRt = Taxes on Corporate Profitst/Corporate Profitst,
where all taxes are at the state level.
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Figure 1: Average tax rates and narrative shock measures, Estonia 2000:I -
2017:IV
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Correlation between personal and corporate income narrative tax changes is
high for this sample and stands at 0.9424. It is only natural since both legal
instruments that make changes to the average corporate income tax rate also
change the average personal income tax rate. However, it does not seem to
be an issue as changing the sequence of the identification does not have a
strong effect on the results.
Time series of average tax rates and narrative tax shocks in 2000-2017 are
depicted in Figure 1 and it can be seen that both the average personal and
the average corporate income tax rates are very volatile even after seasonal
adjustment. Both of them behave abnormally when compared to the rest of
the time frame during the financial crisis of 2009-2010. From 2000 to 2005
the level of APITR fluctuates between 8 to 23 percent, after that it stays
between 7-13 percent except in 2009 and 2010 when it first drops below zero
and then jumps back up to 15 percent. Average corporate income tax rate
shows a slight trend of increase during the time frame starting from around
5 percent and reaching an average of about 10 percent in 2017. Big jumps
in the average tax rate occur in 2009 and 2010 when it reaches 34 and 33
percent respectively.
Several quarterly variables of the Estonian economy will be used to assess the
kind of effects achievable by changing the tax policy. I opt for the following
variables: personal and corporate tax shock proxies which are estimated by
subtracting the mean of non-zero narrative tax shock observations, average
personal income tax rate, average corporate income tax rate, personal in-
come tax base, corporate income tax base, government purchases, real gross
domestic product, the unemployment rate, employment, hours per worker
and labor force. Figure 2 shows how these variables have changed over time
and a more detailed construction of the data is included in the Appendix B.
The data for central bank profits which is used in the estimation of ACITR
and the corporate income tax base is acquired from the website of Eesti Pank.
All other data is retrieved from the database of Statistics Estonia.
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Figure 2: Time series of several indicators on the Estonian economy
Notes: All fiscal variables are given in real terms. Personal and corporate income tax base,
government purchases, output, employment and labor force are given per capita.
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2.2 Method
In order to estimate the effect of tax changes on the economy I use the
narrative accounts mentioned above to identify structural shocks in a SVAR
framework. The approach follows closely Mertens and Ravn (2013), the
notation of the methodology in what follows is the same and more details
can be found in Mertens and Ravn (2013). The idea is to use external
instruments to identify the exogenous changes in the tax rate.
Let Yt be an n× 1 vector of observables. It is assumed that the dynamics of
the observables are described by a system of linear simultaneous equations,
AYt =
p∑
j=1
αjYt−j + εt, (1)
where A is an n × n nonsingular matrix of coefficients (meaning that its
determinant is not equal to zero), αj, j = 1, . . . , p are n× n coefficient ma-
trices and εt is an n×1 vector of structural shocks with E[εt] = 0, E[εtε′t] =
I, E[εtε
′
s] = 0 for s 6= t, where I is the identity matrix. The last expression
means that individual shocks are uncorrelated with each other. Determinis-
tic terms and exogenous regressors in equation (1) are omitted for notational
brevity. Yt can also be expressed as
Yt =
p∑
j=1
δjYt−j + Bεt, (2)
where B = A−1, δj = A−1αj.
In the context of SVAR εt is treated as a vector of latent variables that
are estimated on the basis of the prediction errors of Yt dependent on the
information encompassed in the vector of lagged dependent variables Xt =
[Y′t−1, . . . ,Y
′
t−p]
′, and by imposing identifying assumptions. Reduced form
residuals are denoted by n× 1 vector ut and related to the structural shocks
as
ut = Bεt. (3)
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Using E[εtε
′
t] = I implies that E[utu
′
t] = BB
′ and thus an estimate of the
covariance matrix of ut provides n(n+ 1)/2 independent identifying restric-
tions. An identification of at least one of the column elements of B requires
even more restrictions.
Following the example of Mertens and Ravn (2013) covariance restrictions
will be obtained from proxies for the latent shocks. They denote these proxy
variables as a k× 1 vector mt correlated with k structural shocks of interest
but orthogonal to other shocks. Partition of εt as εt = [ε
′
1t, ε
′
2t]
′ consists
of a k × 1 vector ε′1t of the shocks of interest and a (n − k) × 1 vector ε′2t
containing all other shocks. It is assumed without the loss of generality that
the expected values of these proxies are zero, i.e. E[mt] = 0.
Identification of B will make use of these proxy variables of mt and requires
that they are correlated with the shocks of interest and uncorrelated with
all other shocks. These two conditions can be expressed with the following
equations:
E[mtε
′
1t] = Φ (4)
E[mtε
′
2t] = 0, (5)
where Φ is an unknown nonsingular matrix of dimensions k × k.
Now consider the following partitioning of B:
B =
[
β1
n×k
β2
n×(n−k)
]
, β1 =
[
β′11
k×k
β′21
k×(n−k)
]′
, β2 =
[
β′12
(n−k)×k
β′22
(n−k)×(n−k)
]′
,
where β11 and β22 are nonsingular. This partitioning has the same purpose
as the partitioning of εt  to account for the shocks of interest separately
from all other shocks. From the equations (3)-(5) can be derived
Φβ′1 = E[mu
′] (6)
of dimensions n × k. This system depends on the k2 unknown elements of
Φ and because the only assumption on Φ is its nonsingularity, equation (6)
provides (n − k)k additional identification restrictions. Using this equation
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and partitioning E[mu′] = [E[mu′1] E[mu
′
2]], where E[mu
′
1] is of dimensions
k × k and E[mu′2] is of dimensions k × (n− k), gives
β21 =
(
E−1[mu′1] E[mu
′
2]
)′
β11. (7)
The value of E−1[mu′1] E[mu
′
2] can be estimated and thus this system creates
a collection of covariance restrictions. This estimation process can be divided
into the following three stages:
• First stage: Estimation of the reduced form VAR by least squares.
• Second stage: Estimation of E−1[mu′1] E[mu′2] from regressions of
the VAR residuals on mt.
• Third stage: Imposing the restrictions in (7) and estimating the ob-
jects of interest. Additional identifying assumptions might be included.
In case of a single shock (k = 1) restrictions in (7) are sufficient to identify
the impact of coefficients β1 and ε1t is identified up to a sign convention.
However, in case of more than a single shock (k > 1) additional restrictions
that may vary with the particular application are needed to accompany the
ones in (7). To identify the other shocks ε2t for which proxies might not be
available, traditional short and long run restrictions can also be used.
Currently, the estimate of E−1[mu′1] E[mu
′
2] is equal to the two-stage least
squares (2SLS) estimator in a regression from u2t on u1t using mt as instru-
ments for u1t. As a result, conditions (4)(5) can be taken as the instrument
validity conditions for this regression. Described procedure avoids direct
assumptions on the elements of B and the main requirement is the avail-
ability of proxies that satisfy these two conditions. Imitating Mertens and
Ravn (2013), narratively identified measures of exogenous shocks to aver-
age tax rates will be used to identify structural tax shocks. It is assumed
henceforth that the proxy variables are orthogonal to the history of Yt, i.e.
E[mt X
′
t] = 0.
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An important advantage of the described approach is robustness to various
types of measurement errors since the exact nature of them does not have
an impact on the identification of the impulse responses as long as condi-
tions (4)(5) are met. These errors may arise from falsely evaluating any of
the parameters of narratively identified shocks that include size, timing and
motivation.
To incorporate this robustness in the model, specific assumptions are made
on the outline of proxies and latent shocks. Consider a structure of the SVAR
in equation (2) and the following measurement equations:
mt =Dt(Γε1t + υt), (8)
where Γ is a nonsingular k × k matrix, υt is a k × 1 vector of measurement
errors such that E[υt] = 0, E[υtε
′
1t] = 0 and E[υtυ
′
s] = 0 for s 6= t, and
Dt is a k × k diagonal matrix of ones and zeros tracking zero observations.
Assumptions on Dt are that its diagonal elements are perfectly correlated
meaning that if k > 1 then proxy variables are identically censored and
E[Dtυtε
′
1t] = 0. It is not required that the censoring process of Dt is inde-
pendent of ε1t.
The stochastic process for the proxies in (8) recognizes arbitrary scale which
removes the scaling problem relevant for narratively identified tax shocks.
These scaling problems arise because tax base is generally assumed to re-
main unchanged. Other allowances of system (8) are additive correlated
measurement errors υt and censoring, meaning that realizations ε1t with
larger absolute values are more likely to be detected.
Merging equations (2) and (8) gives the following model:
Yt = θ
′X∗t +wt, (9)
where X∗t = [Y
′
t−1, . . . ,Y
′
t−p, ε
′
1t]
′, θ = [δ′,β1]′, δ = [δ1, . . . , δp]′ and
wt = β2ε2t. Because ε2t is comprised in the expression of wt, it is not fully
observable.
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Equation (9) will be used to determine the dynamic effects of personal and
corporate income tax rates, where Yt consists of the time series of different
macroeconomic variables depicted in Figure 2, X∗t includes their lagged val-
ues and shocks of interest, and wt includes the other shocks for which proxies
are not available.
3 Results
3.1 Main results
To assess the dynamic effects of tax changes I use the main model of seven
variables: average personal and corporate income tax rates, the personal
income tax base (BPIt ), the corporate income tax base (B
CI
t ), government
purchases (Gt), gross domestic product (GDPt) and the unemployment rate
(UNRt). Expression of Yt in equation (9) thus takes the following form:
Yt = [APITRt, ACITRt, ln(B
PI
t ), ln(B
CI
t ), ln(Gt), ln(GDPt), ln(UNRt)].
All fiscal variables are in real per capita terms and on the state level for
Estonia. Precise constructions of all variables are included in the Appendix
B. I use quarterly observations from 2000Q1 to 2017Q4 in the model and
implement a lag of two periods. Impulse responses are for a 1 percentage
point decrease in either APITR or ACITR and predictions are made for 12
quarters. Results show 68 percent confidence intervals using 1000 bootstrap
replications.
Figure 3 depicts the effects of one percentage point cut in the average personal
income tax rate for different orderings of APITR and ACITR. It can be seen
that the initial cut of 1 percentage point in the average personal income
tax rate recovers to the pre-shock level after only about two quarters. The
personal income tax base is not initially affected by the tax cut, but decreases
by approximately 0.5 percent around three quarters after the cut and does
not recover to the initial level during the four-year period of interest.
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Figure 3: Average personal income tax rate cut with the unemployment rate
in the model
Rather surprisingly the results of this model indicate that a tax cut in the
average personal income tax rate leads to a general decline in the economy
since output and government purchases significantly (at the 68 percent level)
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reduce and the unemployment rate is increases. Initially output reduces by
0.5 percent and it stays below the expected level for the whole four year
period while the results are statistically significant for two years after the
tax cut. Government purchases decrease by approximately 1-1.5 percent
and stay around this level for the whole time frame of 12 quarters. The
unemployment rate is not affected by much right after the shock, but it
reaches its peak of increasing by approximately 23 percentage points 3 to
5 quarters after the tax cut. Responses in output and the unemployment
rate may not necessarily be direct outcomes of the tax cut as they can also
reflect the reduced government spending. Thus, caution should be taken
when interpreting these results as pure effects of a tax cut. Results for the
average personal income tax rate, average corporate income tax rate and the
unemloyment rate are nor statistically significant during the whole period
when we count out the initial reduction of APITR by 1 percentage point.
Figure 4 depicts the effects of one percentage point cut in the average corpo-
rate income tax rate for different orderings of APITR and ACITR. It can be
seen that after this initial cut of APITR, it recovers to its pre-shock level af-
ter 3 quarters. This cut induces an initial 3 percent increase in the corporate
income tax base that reaches its expected level after a year and stabilizes
at 0.2 percent below this level 7 quarters after the shock. Output is not
significantly affected this time as it stays close to its expected level. When
ACITR is ordered first, output is not altered at all right after the impact
and it slowly starts decreasing two quarters after the shock. Four years af-
ter the cut it is at -0.2 percent. When APITR is ordered first, the results
show a similar path but at a slightly higher level by 0.2 percent right after
the shock and by 0.1 percent after four years. When ACITR is ordered first
then government purchases initially decrease by 1 percent, after two quarters
peak at -0.1 percent and then stabilize at -0.5 percent after about five to
seven quarters. The response is similar for when APITR is ordered first, but
they are at a higher level by 0.5-0.6 percent during the whole period. The
unemployment rate responds to the average corporate tax rate cut with an
initial decrease of 15 percentage points. When ACITR is ordered first the
20
Figure 4: Average corporate income tax rate cut with the unemployment rate
in the model
unemployment rate reaches its minimum three quarters after the shock at
-1 percentage points, then starts to increase and stabilizes at 9 percentage
points two years after the cut. Results for when APITR is ordered first are
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analogous, but lower by approximately 15 percentage points. Except for the
initial cut in the average corporate income tax rate and the consequent in-
crease in the corporate income tax base, none of the results are statistically
significant in this model for one percentage point cut in ACITR.
In order to assess whether the model is a good fit for the data I find an F
statistic of 4.08 and robust F statistic of 13.65 for this model. According to
Stock et al. (2002) a robust F statistic considerably larger than ten in case of
one instrument first stage regression implies that one can be relatively confi-
dent that weak instrument problem is minimized. Tests for heteroscedasticity
imply that null hypothesis of no ARCH effects should be rejected in case of
ACITR and the unemployment rate (p < 0.05). In case of APITR I find a
p-value equal to 0.0732 and for others it is considerably larger meaning that
there is no evidence to reject the null hypothesis of no ARCH effects. I also
find an R-squared value of 10.86% and adjusted R-squared value of 8.20%
for this model.
Another test to consider is Granger causality because it is assumed in the
model that proxy variables for tax shocks are orthogonal to the history of eco-
nomic variables. It ensures that the changes in economic variables are affected
by the changes in tax rates and not vice versa. I estimate the F statistics
and critical values and keep in mind that the null hypothesis that y does not
Granger Cause x can be rejected if the F statistic is greater than the critical
value. In the context of this work x is the time series of either personal or cor-
porate income tax shocks and y are the instruments used in the model: y =
[APITRt, ACITRt, ln(B
PI
t ), ln(B
CI
t ), ln(Gt), ln(GDPt), ln(UNRt)]. In case
of personal income tax shocks I get the following results: F statistics
F = [4.0953, 10.5645, 7.2175, 5.9914, 0.5314, 8.1052, 6.2002] and critical val-
ues c = [1.1981, 1.0034, 1.1907, 1.1959, 1.0034, 1.1895, 1.1907]. In most cases
the F statistic is bigger than its corresponding critical value, which means
that the null hypothesis that the instruments do not Granger cause tax shocks
can be rejected. The only exception is government purchases.
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Since there are eight narrative shocks in personal income tax I can check
whether the results for Granger causality change if tax shocks in 2009 and
2010 are omitted. It is indeed the case as this time the F statistics F =
[0.0283, 0.3818, 0.7087, 0.0245, 1.5425, 0.9045, 0.0334] are smaller than the
critical values c = [1.0034, 1.0034, 1.0034, 1.0034, 1.0034, 1.0034, 1.0034] in
most cases. It means that when the situation during the financial crisis is
excluded from the analysis then tax changes are not motivated by the current
state of most economic variables. The only exception is again government
purchases.
An explanation for this probably relies on the fact that during the underlying
time frame Estonia has aspired for a balanced national budget. Not only was
this motivated by the objective to start using Euro as a national currency
but also by the shift in perception as the resources for financing budget
deficit seemed to be difficult or even impossible to acquire (Ross, 2014). It
means that in order to keep the national budget in balance, government
spending was adjusted to the amount of available resources. Thus, if taxes
were raised then the government was also able to spend more even if raising
the taxes was not directly motivated by the desire of a more expansive budget
policy. This statement is supported by the results discussed above as we
found evidence for a situation in which the rise in taxes leads to a higher
level of government consumption or as it was previously presented  a cut in
average personal income tax leads to a statistically significant reduction in
government purchases.
In case of corporate income narrative tax changes I find F statistics F =
[0.4801, 4.0118, 9.8938, 7.7798, 0.0201, 13.7309, 7.1465] and critical values
c = [1.0040, 1.1995, 1.1972, 1.1942, 1.0040, 1.1852, 1.1942]. Again, null hy-
pothesis that the instruments do not Granger cause tax shocks can be rejected
in most cases, but not in case of the average personal income tax rate and
government purchases. Since the only two shocks for corporate income taxes
emerged during the financial crisis, it is only natural that these shocks are
motivated by the prevailing situation in the economy as the government was
trying to alleviate the effects of the crisis. Keeping that in mind we should
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be careful when interpreting the results attained in relation to the shocks of
the average corporate income tax rate.
Another thing worth mentioning is the phenomenon referred to as the law of
small numbers according to which one should be careful when interpreting
results derived from a small sample size. Only a short time frame from 2000
to 2017 with eight shocks of personal income tax and two shocks of corporate
income tax meets the criteria of the present study. This means that tests for
Granger causality may present strong correlations in the results even if this
causality may actually be due to chance.
The present study uses the same method as Mertens and Ravn (2003) and
thus the results of the two papers are easily comparable. Two of the main
differences in the setup of our works are the country of interest and the
fact that I substitute government debt for the unemployment rate in the
benchmark model. The reason behind it relies on the matter that government
debt plays a more important role for the American economy than it does for
Estonia. National debt as a percentage of gross domestic product has not
risen above 11 percent between 2000 and 2018 in Estonia while in the U.S.
it has grown from around 55 percent to 105 percent. Results of a model
incorporating government debt are included in the robustness analysis.
Differences in the results of the current study and the one by Mertens and
Ravn (2013) are remarkable. While Mertens and Ravn (2003) observe that a
reduction in taxes provides a boost to the economy in case of the U.S., results
of this study imply that in the context of Estonia the opposite is the case.
Judging from the confidence intervals both findings of this paper that upon
the reduction of the personal income tax rate output falls and their conclusion
that it rises are statistically significant. It is worth mentioning here that I use
68 percent confidence level due to a small sample size while Mertens and Ravn
(2003) use 95 percent confidence level. Another difference worth mentioning
concerns government purchases which I find to be negatively affected by the
reduction of APITR. In case of the U.S. APITR cut does not have such a
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strong effect on government purchases immediately after the tax cut, but
there are signs of declining four years later.
One percentage point cut in the average corporate income tax rate does not
have a strong effect on output and government purchases in the context of
this study, but they are slightly increased in case of America according to
Mertens and Ravn (2003). The corporate income tax base is statistically
significantly increased upon the impact in both of our works by 3-4 percent
and then falls back to its pre-shock level.
In addition, Barro and Redlick (2011) use average marginal income tax rates
to study the output response based on annual American data. They estimate
that one percentage point cut in the average marginal tax rate results in an
increase of next year GDP by 0.5 percent. Their results for output are very
similar to the ones attained by Mertens and Ravn (2003) and thus in contrast
to the current ones by means of the direction of the change.
There are several other studies demonstrating a negative relationship between
tax rates and GPD (Mourougane and Vogel, 2008; Ahmad and Xiao, 2013;
Font et al., 2018; Bajo-Rubio and Gomez-Plana, 2015; Prillaman and Meier,
2014; Sarker et al., 2014; Konopczy«ski, 2013). These studies show that a
cut in business tax rates by one percentage point increases GDP by 0.4-0.5
percent compared to the baseline scenario. On the other hand, a recent study
by Hungerford (2018) finds no statistically significant relationship between
corporate tax rates and economic growth. From Figure 4 it can be seen that
the present study agrees with those results.
As for the Estonian data, a study by Masso and Meriküll (2011) indicates that
by reducing corporate tax rates output is increased and government purchases
is decreased while the present study reveals no statistically significant impact
of corporate income tax rates on these two variables.
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3.2 Detailed results
Labor market
Next I will discuss the dynamic effects of tax changes on the labor mar-
ket. As it was already discussed above many studies show that a reduc-
tion of taxes leads to a lower unemployment rate. However, there are also
studies that find no relationship between tax shocks and unemployment and
even some which suggest that lowering taxes leads to a higher level of un-
employment. To investigate the situation in Estonia I compose a model
encompassing the following variables: average personal and corporate in-
come tax rate, government purchases (Gt), unemployment rate (UNRt),
employment (EMPt), hours per worker (HperWt) and labor force (LFt).
It means that the expression of Yt in equation (9) looks as follows: Yt =
[APITRt, ACITRt, ln(Gt), ln(GDPt), ln(UNRt), ln(EMPt), ln(HperWt),
ln(LFt)]. All fiscal variables are in real terms and on the state level; and all
variables except hours per worker and the unemployment rate are given per
capita.
Figure 5 shows the impact of one percentage point cut in the APITR on
the left panel and in the ACITR on the right panel. It can be seen that
a cut in personal income tax initially does not affect the employment, but
it is reduced by almost 0.5 percent a year after the shock. It starts rising
again after the fifth quarter and reaches the expected level at the end of
the time frame of four years. These results are statistically significant from
the second until the eighth quarter. Hours per worker are significantly lower
than the expected level by 0.14 percent on the impact of lowering PI tax
rates by one percentage point and after two quarters reach its minimum of
0.23 percent. The level of hours per worker then starts to rise and reaches a
value statistically significantly above the expected level seven quarters after
the shock at 0.05 percent where it stays until the end of the time frame.
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Figure 5: Labor market responses to tax cuts. Left panel: average personal
income tax rate cut, right panel: average corporate income tax rate cut
Labor force is only affected by a small amount as it is raised by 0.07 percent
at first, but then it starts to fall and is statistically significantly below the
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expected level four to five quarters after the shock at -0.09 percent. It sta-
bilizes about seven quarters after the impact at -0.03 percent. Based on this
model the unemployment rate is increased by 9 percentage points upon the
reduction of PI tax rate and reaches its maximum of 38 percentage points
three quarters after the cut. After that the unemployment rate starts to fall
and returns to its pre-shock level four years after the cut. Responses in the
unemployment rate are statistically significant at 68 percent confidence level
for two years after the tax cut.
These results indicate that a cut in the average corporate income tax rate
has reverse effects on the labor market when compared to the effects evoked
by a cut in the average personal income tax rate. More specifically, employ-
ment is lowered by 0.05 percent when there is a reduction by one percentage
point in CI tax rate and reaches its maximum one year after the cut at 0.4
percent. Between the third and seventh quarter employment is statistically
significantly above its pre-shock level and four years after the shock it is back
to a negative 0.05 percent.
Hours per worker initially rise by 0.7 percent, peak at 1.6 percent above the
expected level 2 quarters after the tax cut, then gradually decrease and stabi-
lize five quarters later at around -0.03 percent being statistically significantly
below the level zero from seventh to tenth quarter after the impact. Labor
force is reduced by 0.06 percent upon the impact and during the next quarter
by another 0.01 percent. Then it starts to increase and is at its maximum of
0.08 percent four to five quarters after the shock, when the results are also
statistically significant. The level of labor force stabilizes at 0.02 percent
above the pre-shock level about six quarters after the cut. The unemploy-
ment rate is significantly reduced upon the impact until the eighth quarter.
Initially it is lowered by 5 percentage points, during the third quarter it is
at its minimum of -9 percentage points. After that it slowly recovers to its
pre-shock level at the end of the time frame of four years and even slightly
surpasses it by 3 percentage points.
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For the labor market model I estimate an F statistic of 7.58 and robust
F statistic of 49.59. Again, one can be relatively sure that the weak in-
strument problem is not present. Tests for heteroscedasticity show that the
null hypothesis of no ARCH effects should be rejected in case of ACITR
(p = 0.0178), GDP (p = 0.0251) and the unemployment rate (p = 0.0354).
In case of other variables the null hypothesis should not be rejected. R-
squared value for this model turns out to be 18.44% and adjusted R-squared
16.01%.
As in case of the previous model tests for Granger causality are performed.
When all PI tax shocks are included then I get the following F statistics: F =
[3.5089, 12.3089, 0.6963, 12.8318, 9.9348, 4.4550, 2.7300, 2.5529] and critical
values: c = [1.1995, 1.0040, 1.0040, 1.1880, 1.1918, 1.1992, 1.0040, 1.0040].
From these it can be deduced that Granger causality is present for all vari-
ables except government purchases.
I exclude the tax shocks in 2009 and 2010 when the economy was in an ab-
normal state and find new values of F statistics F = [0.0283, 0.3818, 1.5425,
0.9045, 0.0334, 0.2362, 0.3954, 0.3096] and critical values c = [1.0034, 1.0034,
1.0034, 1.0034, 1.0034, 1.0034, 1.0034, 1.0034]. As before, it can be seen that
after eliminating tax shocks that occurred during the financial crisis the re-
maining tax shocks are not influenced by most economic indicators included
in the model except government purchases.
Unfortunately, in case of CI tax the only shocks included in the model came
into force during the financial crisis. Thus, Granger causality test results in F
statistics F = [0.0140, 6.8125, 0.3463, 22.0974, 12.5653, 0.7360, 3.0398, 4.2057]
and critical values c = [1.0040, 1.0040, 1.0040, 1.1852, 1.1992, 1.0040, 1.0040,
1.0040] which imply that CI tax shocks during the financial crisis were in-
fluenced by the state of the average corporate income tax rate, GDP, the
unemployment rate, hours per worker and labor force and not by the state of
the average personal income tax rate, government spending and employment.
The explanation is again related to the governments intent to alleviate the
situation during the financial crisis by modifying the tax rate, but this corre-
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lation may also be due to chance as with small sample size extreme outcomes
are more likely to occur than in case of a big sample size.
Again I compare these results to the ones attained by Mertens and Ravn
(2003) and see that in general the direction of the impact is different for
the two economies. Present results indicate that a cut in average personal
income tax rate leads to a lower level of employment which corresponds to
an increase in the unemployment rate. Mertens and Ravn (2003) find that
employment per capita is initially increased by 0.3 percent and it peaks at 0.8
percent five quarters after the impact while responses in the unemployment
rate show an initial fall by 0.3 percentage points and the strongest response
of -0.5 during the fifth quarter. Hours per worker are negatively affected
upon the impact in the present study and positively affected in Martens and
Ravn's (2003) work.
From the left panel of Figure 5 it can be said that cutting the average cor-
porate income tax rate results in an increase in employment per capita and
reduces the level of the unemployment rate. Mertens and Ravn (2003) found
no statistically significant response for either of these variables as well as for
hours per worker and labor force per population. Estonian data suggests
that hours per worker are slightly increased and labor force fluctuates from
below to above the pre-shock level for seven quarters until it stabilizes.
Articles by Staehr (2008) and Paulus et al. (2007) show how tax policies
affect the labor market in the context of Estonia. Staehr (2007) finds that
by reducing the labor income taxes employment is increased. Paulus et al.
(2007) find that by reducing the labor marginal income tax the unemploy-
ment rate is increased by 1.6 percentage points. Results of the present study
are in accordance with the ones attained by Paulus et al. (2007) since the
left panel of Figure 5 shows an increase in the unemployment rate by 3.4
percentage points as a result of a one percentage point cut in the average
personal income tax rate.
Other studies on this matter generally imply a negative relationship between
the tax rate and the employment rate as a cut in different tax rates by one
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percentage point increases the employment rate by 0.2-0.7 percentage points
(Berger and Everaert, 2010; Carcía and Sala, 2008 and Daveri and Tabellini,
2000; Bajo-Rubio and Gomez-Plana, 2015; Font et al., 2018; Bettendorf
et al., 2009; Neverauskien
e et al., 2017; Planas et al., 2007; Hagedorn et
al., 2016; Võrk et al., 2007; Alho, 2006; Coenen et al., 2008; Böhringer et
al., 2005). Contradicting these results but agreeing with the ones attained
in the present study are presented by Feldmann (2011) and Prillaman and
Meier (2014). Other studies find no evidence in either direction (Cruces et
al., 2010; Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000; Bennmarker et al., 2009 and Hoel,
1989). Ahmad and Xiao (2013) show that a reduction in corporate income
taxes lowers the labor hours while the present paper suggests an increase in
hours per worker when the average corporate income tax rate is decreased.
Other macroeconomic variables
As already mentioned, the model of benchmark results incorporates average
personal and corporate income tax rates, log levels of personal and corporate
income tax base, log level of government purchases, log level of real gross
domestic product, and log level of the unemployment rate. I experiment with
different compositions of this model by substituting the unemployment rate
with government debt, investments, and consumption of nondurables and
services. Compared to alternative models the one I present as the benchmark
model produces the most consistent results when altering the ordering of
APITR and ACITR. Results of these alternative models can be found in the
Appendix C as Figures 6-11.
In case of the model that includes government debt, all results portraying
APITR cut become statistically insignificant and outcomes of ACITR cut
only change their volume. Government debt itself stays close to its expected
level in both cases. Substituting the unemployment rate with investments
produces a slower recovery of output and personal income tax base to their
pre-shock level. In fact, they are both still statistically significantly below
this level four years after the cut in APITR. Investments are statistically
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significantly reduced from the third quarter. Results for ACITR cut do not
change their statistical insignificance. The last alternative model incorpo-
rating consumption of nondurables and services does not change any on the
results for either APITR or ACITR cut in an important way. Consumption
itself is statistically significantly reduced from the second quarter by a cut in
APITR and not statistically significantly altered by a cut in ACITR.
Literature suggests that there is a negative relationship between the income
tax rate and investments (Masso et al., 2013; Salotti and Trecroti, 2015; Ab-
dio§lu et al., 2016; Font et al., 2018; Bhattarai and Trzeciakiewicz, 2017)
meaning that by reducing the tax rate investments increase. The present
study does not support this argument, but also does not produce a strong ev-
idence to claim otherwise as only 68 percent confidence levels are used. Con-
sumption has been argued both to increase (Bhattarai and Trzeciakiewicz,
2017; Masso and Meriküll, 2011) and decrease (Font et al., 2018) after a cut
in income taxes. Results of the present paper agree with the ones attained
by Font et al. (2018) as it is found that by cutting the personal income
tax rate consumption is decreased while a cut in the corporate income tax
rate does not produce a statistically significant outcome in investments nor
consumption.
3.3 Robustness
In order to assess the level of influence of individual tax shocks I will now
describe what happens when personal income tax shocks are excluded one at
a time. These results are depicted in Figures 12-35 in the Appendix C. In the
event of removing personal income tax shock in 2004 reductions in output,
personal income tax base, and government purchases as a result of a cut in
APITR lose their statistical significance at 68 percent confidence level, but
the general behavior of these variables over time remains the same compared
to the original results. Also, by excluding personal income tax shock in 2011
or 2012, the unemployment rate is statistically significantly increased from
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fifth to tenth quarter after APITR shock. Removal of other personal income
tax shocks does not alter the results in any apparent way.
Next, I exclude personal income tax changes in 2009 and 2010. As can be
seen from Figures 36-38 in Appendix C, macroeconomic responses to income
tax shocks are not altered when the effects of a financial crisis are eliminated.
In addition to that I include personal income tax changes one by one while
keeping both corporate income tax changes intact (Figures 39-56 in Appendix
C). Responses are unstable and fall outside of confidence intervals when per-
sonal income tax change either only in 2011 or 2013 is included. Since these
results are not feasible for interpretation, they are not included in the Ap-
pendix C. If the only included personal income tax change is the one that
happened in 2004 then government purchases increase right after an APITR
shock by 1.8 percent, but after a few quarters are back to their expected level
and fall significantly below this level by the end of four years. Interesting
transformations happen when the only included personal income tax change
is the one in 2007. Responses in output, personal income tax base and the
unemployment rate change their direction after an APITR shock meaning
that the tax shock in 2007 caused output and the personal income tax base
to increase and the unemployment rate to fall. However, only 68 percent
confidence level is used and the mentioned responses are barely statistically
significant even at that level. Other results are similar to the original results
changing only their statistical significance in some cases.
Lastly, I include only one corporate income tax shock and either all personal
income tax changes or only the ones in 2009 and 2010 (Figures 57-68 in
Appendix C). There are no alterations worth mentioning in these results.
4 Conclusions
The paper studies how average personal and corporate income tax rates influ-
ence the Estonian economy by the use of narratively identified tax changes
33
and SVAR methodology. Surprisingly a reduction of the average personal
income tax rate by one percentage point decreases output by up to 0.6 per-
cent and government purchases by as much as 1.5 percent. Moreover, this
reduction in the average personal income tax rate reduces employment by
0.5 percent and increases the unemployment rate by 3.4 percentage points.
All of these results are statistically significant at 68 percent confidence level.
A one percentage point cut in the average corporate income tax rate does not
lead to statistically significant changes in output and government purchases.
Nevertheless, employment is shown to increase by 0.4 percent and the unem-
ployment rate is shown to decrease by 2.7 percentage points as an aftermath
of a cut in the average corporate income tax rate by one percentage point.
The fact that government spending is not changed by a reduction in cor-
porate taxes indicates that Estonian government purchases are not heavily
financed through corporate income tax revenues.
The main contribution of this paper lies in the use of narratively identified tax
shocks that are identified from the legislative tax acts; and the differentiation
between anticipated and unanticipated tax shocks. Another importance is
the separation of personal and corporate income taxes and the use of Estonian
data as a small open economy with conservative budget policy as all these
factors make Estonia an interesting subject for macroeconomic analysis.
The main limitation of this study is a short time frame (2000-2017) that
results in a small sample of relevant tax shocks. There are only eight changes
of personal income tax and two changes of corporate income tax meeting the
requirements that they are not expected long before implementation. It
is also important to mention that two of the personal income tax shocks
and both of the corporate income tax shocks occurred during the financial
crisis. However, robustness analysis shows that the results are consistent
and not strongly transformed by any individual shock. Effects resulting from
a cut in either the average personal or average corporate income tax rate
have opposite signs for employment and unemployment. It is likely due to
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the reaction of government spending. Therefore caution must be taken in
interpreting the effects as the pure effects of tax changes.
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Appendix A. Tax changes
1. Income tax act of 2003
Change in tax revenue: 2004Q1: -45.8 million euros (-716 million Es-
tonian kroons) (PI)
The basic exemption deductible from the income of a resident natural
person during a period of taxation is changed from 12 000 kroons to 16
800 kroons.
2. Social tax act of 2006
Change in tax revenue: 2007Q1: 1.3 million euros (20 million Estonian
kroons) (PI)
Monthly rate of social tax is changed from 14000 kroons to 2000 kroons.
3. Income tax act of 2008
Change in tax revenue: 2009Q1: 170.0 million euros (PI); 244.1 million
euros (CI)
The rate of income tax is changed from the announced 20 per cent to
21 per cent; and the basic exemption deductible from the income of a
resident natural person during a period of taxation is changed from the
announced 30 000 kroons to 27 000 kroons.
4. Income tax act of 2009
Change in tax revenue: 2010Q1: 204.5 million euros (PI); 184.3 million
euros (CI)
The rate of income tax is changed from the announced 20 per cent to
21 per cent; and the basic exemption deductible from the income of a
resident natural person during a period of taxation is changed from the
announced 30 000 kroons to 27 000 kroons.
5. Income tax act of 2010
Change in tax revenue: 2011Q1: -0.3 million euros (PI)
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The basic exemption deductible from the income of a resident natural
person during a period of taxation is changed from 27 000 kroons to
1728 euros.
6. Social tax act of 2011
Change in tax revenue: 2012Q1: 0.4 million euros (PI)
Monthly rate of social tax is changed from 278.02 euros to 290 euros.
7. Social tax act of 2012
Change in tax revenue: 2013Q1: 1.0 million euros (PI)
Monthly rate of social tax is changed from 290 euros to 320 euros.
8. Social tax act of 2015
Change in tax revenue: 2016Q1: 1.5 million euros (PI)
Monthly rate of social tax is changed from 390 euros to 430 euros.
Appendix B. Data definitions
Personal income tax base is logarithm of personal income plus contri-
butions to government social insurance less government transfers divided by
GDP deflator and by population; corporate income tax base is logarithm
of corporate profits less Central Bank profits divided by GDP deflator and
by population; average personal income tax rate is personal income
tax revenues including contributions to government social insurance divided
by personal income plus contributions to government social insurance less
government transfers; average corporate income tax rate is corporate
income tax revenues divided by corporate profits less Central Bank prof-
its; government spending is logarithm of real government consumption
and investment expenditures divided by population; output is logarithm of
real gross domestic product divided by population; government debt is
logarithm of government debt divided by GDP deflator and by population;
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employment is logarithm of total economy employment divided by popu-
lation; hours per worker is logarithm of total economy hours worked di-
vided by total economy employment; labor force is logarithm of labor force
(sum of employed and unemployed) divided by population; consumption
of nondurables and services is logarithm of chain-aggregated nondurable
consumption and service goods consumption divided by population; unem-
ployment rate is the level of unemployment rate; investments is logarithm
of gross fixed capital formation and valuables.
Appendix C. Robustness
Experimenting with different models
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Model: APITR, ACITR, PITB, CITB, government spending, out-
put, government debt.
Figure 6: APITR cut with government debt in the model
45
Figure 7: ACITR cut with government debt in the model
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Model: APITR, ACITR, PITB, CITB, government spending, out-
put, investments.
Figure 8: APITR cut with investments in the model
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Figure 9: ACITR cut with investments in the model
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Model: APITR, ACITR, PITB, CITB, government spending, out-
put, consumption of nondurables and services.
Figure 10: APITR cut with consumption of nondurables and services in the
model
49
Figure 11: ACITR cut with consumption of nondurables and services in the
model
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Exclude PI taxes one by one
Exclude PI tax change in 2004
Figure 12: APITR cut with unemployment rate in the model
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Figure 13: ACITR cut with unemployment rate in the model
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Figure 14: Labor market responses to tax cuts. Left panel: APITR cut, right
panel: ACITR cut
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Exclude PI tax change in 2007
Figure 15: APITR cut with unemployment rate in the model
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Figure 16: ACITR cut with unemployment rate in the model
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Figure 17: Labor market responses to tax cuts. Left panel: APITR cut, right
panel: ACITR cut
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Exclude PI tax change in 2009
Figure 18: APITR cut with unemployment rate in the model
57
Figure 19: ACITR cut with unemployment rate in the model
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Figure 20: Labor market responses to tax cuts. Left panel: APITR cut, right
panel: ACITR cut
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Exclude PI tax change in 2010
Figure 21: APITR cut with unemployment rate in the model
60
Figure 22: ACITR cut with unemployment rate in the model
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Figure 23: Labor market responses to tax cuts. Left panel: APITR cut, right
panel: ACITR cut
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Exclude PI tax change in 2011
Figure 24: APITR cut with unemployment rate in the model
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Figure 25: ACITR cut with unemployment rate in the model
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Figure 26: Labor market responses to tax cuts. Left panel: APITR cut, right
panel: ACITR cut
65
Exclude PI tax change in 2012
Figure 27: APITR cut with unemployment rate in the model
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Figure 28: ACITR cut with unemployment rate in the model
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Figure 29: Labor market responses to tax cuts. Left panel: APITR cut, right
panel: ACITR cut
68
Exclude PI tax change in 2013
Figure 30: APITR cut with unemployment rate in the model
69
Figure 31: ACITR cut with unemployment rate in the model
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Figure 32: Labor market responses to tax cuts. Left panel: APITR cut, right
panel: ACITR cut
71
Exclude PI tax change in 2016
Figure 33: APITR cut with unemployment rate in the model
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Figure 34: ACITR cut with unemployment rate in the model
73
Figure 35: Labor market responses to tax cuts. Left panel: APITR cut, right
panel: ACITR cut
74
Exclude PI tax changes in 2009 and 2010
Figure 36: APITR cut with unemployment rate in the model
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Figure 37: ACITR cut with unemployment rate in the model
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Figure 38: Labor market responses to tax cuts. Left panel: APITR cut, right
panel: ACITR cut
77
Include PI tax changes one by one
Include both CI tax changes and PI tax change in 2004
Figure 39: APITR cut with unemployment rate in the model
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Figure 40: ACITR cut with unemployment rate in the model
79
Figure 41: Labor market responses to tax cuts. Left panel: APITR cut, right
panel: ACITR cut
80
Include both CI tax changes and PI tax change in 2007
Figure 42: APITR cut with unemployment rate in the model
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Figure 43: ACITR cut with unemployment rate in the model
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Figure 44: Labor market responses to tax cuts. Left panel: APITR cut, right
panel: ACITR cut
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Include both CI tax changes and PI tax change in 2009
Figure 45: APITR cut with unemployment rate in the model
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Figure 46: ACITR cut with unemployment rate in the model
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Figure 47: Labor market responses to tax cuts. Left panel: APITR cut, right
panel: ACITR cut
86
Include both CI tax changes and PI tax change in 2010
Figure 48: APITR cut with unemployment rate in the model
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Figure 49: ACITR cut with unemployment rate in the model
88
Figure 50: Labor market responses to tax cuts. Left panel: APITR cut, right
panel: ACITR cut
89
Include both CI tax changes and PI tax change in 2012
Figure 51: APITR cut with unemployment rate in the model
90
Figure 52: ACITR cut with unemployment rate in the model
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Figure 53: Labor market responses to tax cuts. Left panel: APITR cut, right
panel: ACITR cut
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Include both CI tax changes and PI tax change in 2016
Figure 54: APITR cut with unemployment rate in the model
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Figure 55: ACITR cut with unemployment rate in the model
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Figure 56: Labor market responses to tax cuts. Left panel: APITR cut, right
panel: ACITR cut
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Include CI tax changes one by one
Include CI tax change in 2009 and all PI tax changes
Figure 57: APITR cut with unemployment rate in the model
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Figure 58: ACITR cut with unemployment rate in the model
97
Figure 59: Labor market responses to tax cuts. Left panel: APITR cut, right
panel: ACITR cut
98
Include CI tax change in 2009 and PI tax changes in 2009 and 2010
Figure 60: APITR cut with unemployment rate in the model
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Figure 61: ACITR cut with unemployment rate in the model
100
Figure 62: Labor market responses to tax cuts. Left panel: APITR cut, right
panel: ACITR cut
101
Include CI tax change in 2010 and all PI tax changes
Figure 63: APITR cut with unemployment rate in the model
102
Figure 64: ACITR cut with unemployment rate in the model
103
Figure 65: Labor market responses to tax cuts. Left panel: APITR cut, right
panel: ACITR cut
104
Include CI tax change in 2010 and PI tax changes in 2009 and 2010
Figure 66: APITR cut with unemployment rate in the model
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Figure 67: ACITR cut with unemployment rate in the model
106
Figure 68: Labor market responses to tax cuts. Left panel: APITR cut, right
panel: ACITR cut
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